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Changing Fortunes 
or 
Changing Attitudes?
Sentencing and
Corrections Reforms 
in 2003
Jon Wool
Don Stemen
AS  S T A T E  L E G I S L A T O R S
and governors begin to address sentencing
and corrections policy in the third straight
year of severe economic crisis, what can they
learn from their colleagues’ recent efforts? In
addition to continued cutting of administrative
costs, more than 25 states took steps to lessen
sentences and otherwise modify sentencing
and corrections policy during the 2003
legislative sessions. Thirteen states made
significant changes, ranging from the repeal
or reduction of mandatory minimum sen-
tences for drug-related offenses to the
expansion of treatment-centered alternatives
to incarceration. These developments suggest
that many states have changed the way they
look at sentencing and incarceration.1
This Issue in Brief surveys the most recent
changes to the states’ sentencing and correc-
tions policies to identify the range of reforms
being implemented in these persistently 
tight economic times. It also explores whether
there is more to these developments than
fiscal belt-tightening. Do changes in law 
and policy indicate fundamental shifts in
attitudes about appropriate responses to
various types of offenses and offenders? 
If so, in what ways? 
Although such questions cannot be
answered with certainty until more time has
passed, this paper examines several recent
examples of reforms that suggest that
attitudes, and not just fortunes, have changed.
The differences are most evident in three
areas: a greater use of data to structure
sentencing policy, as seen in Alabama’s
sentencing reforms; a growing concern for
proportionality in sentencing, as reflected in
Delaware’s realigning of mandatory mini-
mum sentences for drug traffickers and some
violent offenders; and a renewed focus on
rehabilitation, illustrated by Kansas’s empha-
sis on replacing incarceration with substance
abuse treatment and Arizona’s efforts to build
sound transition programming. 
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Before turning to these examples, however, we offer a
survey of state actions across the country. The survey
begins by examining ongoing efforts to cut or shift
correctional costs. It then describes efforts to turn toward
more rational, data-driven sentencing structures by
empanelling sentencing commissions. It also reviews 
two sentencing changes that depart from the get-tough
philosophy of the last 20 years: an increase in support for
early release provisions, including reducing the demands
of truth in sentencing, and the development of new
approaches to technical violators. The survey concludes by
examining two other closely related initiatives: a push to
repeal or reduce minimum sentences for nonviolent
offenders and efforts to create or expand treatment-based
alternatives to incarceration for addicted offenders. 
Recent Changes to Sentencing and 
Corrections Law and Policy
The states faced an aggregate $78 billion deficit for fiscal
year 2004, following hard upon a $75 billion shortfall 
for fiscal year 2003. Two-thirds of the states faced 2004
budget gaps amounting to five percent of their general
funds; more than one-third faced shortfalls exceeding 
10 percent.2 Some recent signs suggest that an economic
rebound may be beginning to reach state treasuries, 
but there is little evidence that fortunes will improve
significantly in the near future; projected deficits for
fiscal year 2005 stand at $39–$41 billion.3
The protracted budget crunch has been particularly
difficult for corrections departments. For more than a
decade they had become accustomed to uninterrupted
budgetary growth—from an aggregate $7 billion bud-
geted in 1990 to $35 billion in 1999—mirroring ever-
expanding prison and jail populations.4 Table 1 shows the
changes to corrections budgets and the range of cost-
cutting responses in the current and prior fiscal years.
Cutting or Shifting Costs. From the onset of the fiscal
crises states have tried to cut corrections costs with
varying success. The effort continues. Vera inquiries
revealed that at least nine states decreased their actual
corrections expenditures in fiscal year 2003, and at least
14 cut their initial corrections appropriations in fiscal year
2004.5 Examples of ways in which corrections depart-
ments have cut costs include the elimination of 500 beds
in Utah, 146 fewer corrections officer positions in
Missouri, and an end to funding for educational program-
ming in Kentucky. Although there were countervailing
occurrences—Arkansas, for example, reopened some
The legislative changes to sentencing and
corrections laws discussed in this paper
illustrate that in at least some jurisdictions
criminal justice policy is no longer the
divisive political wedge it once was. Fiscal
concerns are providing common ground—
and a political safe harbor—for officials of all
political stripes looking to temper reliance on
incarceration.
But, even if the politics are less contentious,
a big question lingers: are the changes solely
motivated by financial crisis or do they
reflect a shift in thinking among policymak-
ers about what constitutes good criminal
justice policy? According to this latest
installment of Vera’s Issues in Brief series,
the answer appears to be that minds are
changing along with policy.
Whatever one’s motivation, engaging in, or
even thinking strategically about, reform
possibilities is no easy effort. Vera’s State
Sentencing and Corrections Program (SSC)
provides nonpartisan, non-prescriptive
assistance to policymakers from all branches
of government involved in such tasks. SSC
draws on the expertise of a national network
of practitioners to provide counsel that is
grounded in the substantive and political
considerations that inform these processes.
To learn more about how SSC has supported
officials in some 20 states, contact (212)
376-3073, dwilhelm@vera.org, or visit the
program’s web site at www.vera.org/ssc.
Daniel F. Wilhelm, Director
State Sentencing and Corrections Program
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Table 1. Corrections Budget Changes and Cost-Saving Efforts in Fiscal Years 2003 and 2004 
Corrections Budget Changes Cost-Saving Efforts
% Change % Change % Change Closed Renegotiated Reduced
in Initial in Actual in Initial Facilities; Contracts; Payments to
Appropriations Expenditures  Appropriations Delayed Openings; Reduced Staff; Eliminated Eliminated Delayed Private Prisons
State from FY 02 to FY 03 from FY 02 to FY 03 from FY 03 to FY 04 Reduced Beds Froze Hiring Programs Pay Increases Maintenance Local Jails
AL 13.76 11.87 6.74    
AK 4.40 NA -4.20    
AZ -0.21 5.37 4.41 • •
AR -3.94 7.34 10.39 • • •
CA NA NA 4.49 • •
CO 2.93 NA 3.22 • •
CT 4.25 3.39 6.13    
DE 3.28 3.50 1.45 • • •
FL 1.85 2.53 6.01 •
GA 1.40 1.97 -1.17    
HI 1.15 4.08 6.37 • • • •
ID -12.25 -10.95 2.41 •
IL NA -9.76 6.33 • • •
IN 0.55 3.44 3.53 • •
IA 1.12 2.56 5.09 • •
KS 0.09 -0.54 -0.36 • •
KY -5.98 -0.45 8.16 • • •
LA 5.32 NA 1.47  • • •
ME 5.13 4.73 12.35    
MD 4.24 NA -1.50    
MA 17.07 NA 4.05 •
MI 0.00 NA 2.05 • • •
MN 4.73 7.00 1.17 •
MS 1.44 1.40 -7.70    
MO 7.11 5.91 2.53 • •
MT 0.68 NA 10.04    
NE 12.05 16.41 5.79 •
NV 3.44 3.36 0.85 •
NH 3.98 3.50 2.49    
NJ -1.45 4.25 6.40    
NM 4.48 4.83 4.33 • •
NY 0.43 0.31 -1.05 • •
NC -4.76 NA 6.84    
ND -2.30 NA 6.36 • •
OH 2.30 NA 3.70 • •
OK 1.20 -4.51 -4.81 • • •
OR 8.33 -8.86 -10.24  •
PA 10.04 NA 2.54    
RI 3.57 7.64 2.86    
SC -3.65 3.79 -6.11 • •
SD NA -15.28 NA    
TN 5.03 NA -1.95 • •
TX 0.84 -2.34 -5.30    
UT -4.00 -0.70 -0.21 • • •
VT 3.57 5.76 -52.12* • • •
VA 0.32 -0.94 -4.63    
WA 6.66 6.66 -3.67    
WV 16.60 16.60 1.27    
WI 2.35 NA 0.72 • • •
WY -15.70 NA 10.88    
All appropriation and expenditure figures are for adult incarceration through general fund, non-capital expenditures, except in the following states: Alaska includes probation and parole;
Arkansas includes local jails; California includes parole; Colorado includes community services and parole board; Delaware includes probation and parole; Georgia includes probation;
Hawaii includes parole; Illinois includes parole and juvenile; Indiana includes community corrections and juvenile; Iowa includes probation and parole; Kentucky includes probation,
parole, and local jails; Maine includes probation, parole, and juvenile; Michigan includes community corrections; Mississippi includes probation and parole; Missouri includes probation
and parole; Montana includes probation and parole; New Mexico includes community corrections; North Dakota includes probation, parole, and juvenile; Ohio includes juvenile;
Oklahoma includes probation and parole; Vermont includes probation and parole; West Virginia includes parole; Wisconsin includes probation, parole, and juvenile.
* Vermont’s 2004 budget supplements $50 million in general fund appropriations with one-time federal funds.
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mothballed facilities for use as
intermediate sanctions and treat-
ment centers—there was widespread
pressure to achieve immediate
savings and avoid present and future
costs. In two extreme cases—North
Carolina and Texas—the mandate to
slim down was passed on to inmates
through a reduction in the number
of meals they were served.6
States also became more aggres-
sive in 2003 in shifting corrections
costs to offenders themselves.
Although fees charged to offenders
are by no means new—jailer’s fees,
for example, predate this nation—
they emerged as an attractive
prospect in 17 states. Illinois doubled
its monthly probation supervision
fees from $25 to $50; Oklahoma
quadrupled its electronic monitoring
fee to $300 a month. However, the
newfound popularity of this strategy
occasions an unresolved debate
about its appropriateness as a
correctional tool. While some argue
that such fees can help substance-
abusing offenders and others to
“own” their treatment, opponents
contend that they improperly shift
costs to those least able to afford
them and force probation officers to
become debt collectors.7 A similar
discussion continues over whether
such fees are effective as a revenue
source. Texas, which has long relied
on fees, reported that its probation
supervision fees supported one-third
of the costs of its county probation
departments in fiscal year 2001.8
In contrast, Olmsted County,
Minnesota, reported that its new
mandate to collect county jail fees
cost almost twice as much to
administer as it took in.9
Empanelling Sentencing
Commissions. Three states
established or resurrected sentenc-
ing commissions in 2003, while
four others created study commis-
sions dedicated to a particular
corrections topic. The work of
sentencing commissions relies on
greater use of data collection and
analysis and often results in the
promulgation of sentencing guide-
lines. States taking this route often
believe that commissions can
improve their analytical capacity to
achieve better resource allocation
and fairer, more consistent sentenc-
ing practices. As scholar Michael
Tonry has observed: “Guidelines
promulgated by commissions have
altered sentencing patterns and
practices, have reduced sentencing
disparities and gender and race
effects, and have shown that
sentencing policies can be linked to
correctional and other resources,
thereby enhancing governmental
accountability and protecting the
public purse.”10 Unlike ad hoc and
incremental efforts at legislative or
executive decision making in this
area, commissions offer a rational
and comprehensive approach to
policies affecting sentencing. As
Tonry says, some commissions “have
achieved and maintained specialized
States that shifted corrections costs
Alaska (SB 124) reduced its share of support to drug and alcohol treatment centers
from 90 percent to 75 percent.
California (AB 1759) imposed a $20 court security fee for criminal convictions.
Colorado (SB 177, SB 186) reduced state funds for local community corrections
agencies and increased monthly probation supervision fees from $45 to $50.
Florida (HB 113A) enacted a $40 fee to apply for appointed counsel. 
Georgia (SB 47) enacted a $25 fee for those seeking to transfer parole or probation
supervision to another state. 
Idaho (HB 50, HB 71) enacted an interstate parole transfer fee of up to $100 and
increased monthly parole and probation fees from $35 to $40.
Illinois (SB 1457) enacted an interstate parole transfer fee of up to $125 and doubled
monthly probation fees to $50.
Indiana (SB 205, SB 506) enacted an interstate parole transfer fee of $75 and
increased monthly probation fees to $30 plus a one-time fee of $100.
Kansas (HB 2121) doubled its fee to apply for appointed counsel to $100.
Louisiana (HB 1732) enacted a $40 fee to apply for appointed counsel.
Minnesota (SB 2A) increased its fee to apply for appointed counsel from $25 to $200.
Mississippi (HB 675) increased monthly parole and probation fees from $30 to $35.
Montana (HB 222, HB 453) enacted an interstate parole transfer fee of $50 and
made all inmates responsible for their medical and dental expenses.
Nebraska (LB 46) enacted new $25 to $30 monthly parole and probation supervision
fees plus a one-time probation fee of $30.
Nevada (AB 29) increased assessments on all offenders convicted of a misdemeanor. 
New Mexico (SB 653) raised the daily fee (from $0.75 to $2.00) that privately
operated prisons pay to the county that they are located in for each out-of-state inmate.
New York (S 1406-B/A 2106-B) raised the combined conviction fee/surcharge by an
average of 32 percent and created a new fee for sex offender registration.
Oklahoma (HB 1484) quadrupled offenders’ monthly electronic monitoring fee to $300.
Tennessee (SB 1861/HB 1985) increased monthly probation fees from $35 to $45.
Utah (HB 112) required offenders sentenced to county correctional facilities to pay the
costs of their incarceration.
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institutional competence, have to a
degree insulated sentencing policy
from short-term ‘crime of the 
week’ political pressures, and have
maintained a focus on comprehen-
sive system-wide policymaking.”11
New Mexico is among the
jurisdictions moving toward a
commission model. It transformed
its state criminal justice council 
into a sentencing commission by
granting it new resources and a
specific mandate to recommend an
overhaul of the state’s sentencing
system. As part of a long-term
initiative to reform its sentencing
practices, Nebraska created a
Community Corrections Council to
develop and ultimately implement
statewide enhanced community
corrections options, including
voluntary sentencing guidelines. 
The third state, Wisconsin, is in the
early stages of formulating a work
plan for its new commission. 
Expanding Early Release
Provisions. In 2003 at least 13 states
went beyond cutting and shifting
costs to change significant aspects of
their sentencing and incarceration
systems in ways that depart from the
get-tough approaches of the last 20
years. At least nine states effectively
altered sentences by applying
prospective and retroactive increases
to existing early release credits.12
For example, although efforts to
reform its stringent drug sentences
stalled, New York enacted two
earned-release provisions. One
grants highest-level drug offenders,
who previously were ineligible for
any early release credit, twice the
merit time available to other
inmates. The state estimates that
this change will expedite the release
of 1,300 offenders in its first year.
The second provision creates a
mechanism called “presumptive
release” that allows those who have
adhered to a correctional program
plan to be released at their earliest
eligibility date without review by the
state’s parole board. 
By focusing on such back-end
sentence adjustments rather than
outright reductions that are more
likely to attract public attention,
elected officials may be trying to
insulate themselves from charges 
of being soft on crime. Yet even in
some states where truth in sentenc-
ing has been explicitly codified,
policymakers have expanded early
release provisions. Despite protests
from some law enforcement officials,
Washington increased the amount of
earned-release time available to most
drug and property offenders from 33
to 50 percent of their sentences. Iowa
took a more direct route, reducing 
its truth-in-sentencing time-served
requirement from 85 to 70 percent.
In making such changes, these 
states appear to be eroding the core
principle of truth in sentencing, a
historically powerful icon of the
tough-on-crime approach.
New Approaches to Technical
Violators. In another departure 
from the policies of the last decades,
states are rethinking approaches to
some violators of probation or
States that expanded emergency and early 
release mechanisms
Alabama (HB 3B) authorized four additional “special members” of the parole board
with the goal of expediting the release of 5,000 low-level felony offenders.
Arizona (SB 1291) allowed inmates participating in a transition program to be
released three months earlier than their prior earliest release date.
Arkansas (SB 720) expanded the Board of Correction’s powers to declare an
overcrowding emergency and release nonviolent state inmates from prison when the
state prison backlog in county jails rises above 500 inmates. 
Indiana (SB 482) allowed most offenders to receive additional good time credit for
having earned a diploma or degree before July 1, 1999, or for the completion of a
literacy and basic life skills program.
Iowa (SF 422) decreased the amount of time violent offenders are required to serve
from 85 to 70 percent of their sentence. 
Missouri (SB 5) allowed earlier parole eligibility for many classes of offenders. 
Nebraska (LB 46) eliminated two requirements—that offenders with drug or alcohol
convictions serve 12 months before parole eligibility, and that offenders convicted of
certain drug offenses complete treatment prior to becoming eligible for parole—and
created a legislatively imposed prison cap and an emergency release mechanism for
when the prison population exceeds the cap. 
Nevada (AB 105) allowed offenders to earn sentence reduction credits while on parole
and authorized the Department of Correction to award additional credits to parolees for
diligence in labor or study. 
New York (S 1406-B/A 2106-B) created a “presumptive release” program that allows
offenders who receive an earned eligibility certificate to be released by the Department
of Correctional Services without review by the parole board. It also provided A-1 drug
offenders with a merit time credit of up to one-third of the minimum term. 
Washington (SB 5990) increased the maximum earned-release time available to most
drug and property offenders from 33 percent of their sentences to 50 percent. 
Wisconsin (SB 44) authorized most inmates to petition the sentencing court for
placement in a facility-based drug treatment program, upon completion of which they
must be paroled regardless of the length remaining in their sentences. 
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parole. National statistics indicate
that a substantial number of those
admitted to prison each year are
probation or parole violators.
Research in the states suggests that
most of these men and women are
imprisoned for technical violations,
generally defined as those in which
the violator has no new criminal
conviction.13 The Bureau of Justice
Statistics reports that 36 percent of
state prison admissions in 2001, or
some 215,000 offenders, were parole
violators who did not have a new
court commitment.14 In Kansas, 
for example, 65 percent of prison
admissions in fiscal year 2003 were
probation and parole/post-release
violators sentenced for reasons other
than a new conviction.15 As they
begin to recognize the costs associ-
ated with these numbers, state
policymakers are altering statutes
and regulations to limit incarceration
of technical violators.
A legacy of exceptionally long
probation terms in Delaware left the
state with 3.4 percent of its adult
population under supervision—the
second highest rate in the nation,
behind Washington (and tied with
Texas).16 As a consequence, viola-
tions, including technical violations,
make up 40 percent of jail and
prison admissions.17 To reduce this
rate, Delaware’s legislature cut
probation terms to a maximum of
two years for all but sex and violent
offenders and provided for adminis-
trative, non-prison resolution of
technical violations. Washington
sought to reduce the number of 
its technical violators by ending
supervision of those who are
released after serving sentences for
low-level felonies, not including
those whose release is conditioned
on participation in treatment.
Another state with a large popula-
tion of technical violators, Colorado,
simply limited the incarceration
period for technical violations of
parole to 180 days and authorized
commitment to a revocation center
instead of prison.18
Rethinking Minimum Sentences
for Nonviolent Offenders. Before
the fiscal crises, legislators focused
almost exclusively on increasing
sentence lengths in response to
perceived public pressure. Policy-
makers now appear to be comfort-
able exploring reductions in prison
sentences, too—at least for nonvio-
lent offenders. It is not clear how
much of this shift is an effort to
weather tough fiscal times before
returning to the policies of old, but
some legislators appear to have
become convinced that, money
aside, sentencing policy should
change. Notably, a central tenet of
the tough-on-crime approach,
mandatory minimum sentencing, 
is on the table. 
Five states reduced sentences 
for nonviolent offenders in 2003.
Michigan took a broad approach in
the last days of 2002, reducing
mandatory minimum sentences
across the board for drug offenses.
The effort gained national attention
because it repealed some of the
country’s most stringent drug
sentences.19 Delaware reduced
mandatory minimum sentences
more incrementally by focusing on
making drug sentences less severe in
proportion to sentences for violent
offenses (see page 10). Two other
noteworthy initiatives, in Colorado
and Washington, linked sentence
reductions to increases in rehabilita-
tive programming. In both states,
savings resulting from giving
substance-abusing offenders shorter
sentences are channeled to provide
those offenders with facility- and
community-based treatment. 
On the other hand, at least six
other states—Louisiana, Maryland,
Montana, New Hampshire, New
York, and North Carolina—consid-
ered, but did not enact, legislation 
to reduce sentences for particular
categories of offenders. The reasons
behind these decisions vary, but 
four concerns are commonly voiced:
that the public will view reducing
minimum sentences as soft on
crime, which remains a political
liability; that alternatives to incarcera-
tion are either ineffective or serve
insufficiently to punish offenders;
States that altered approaches to technical probation 
and parole violations
Arkansas (HB 1006A, HB 1024A) committed over the next biennium $6.6 million to
build and $12 million to operate a technical violator center.
Colorado (SB 252) allowed the Parole Board to revoke nonviolent violators to a com-
munity corrections program or a pre-parole release and revocation center and limited to
180 days the time a nonviolent parolee can be revoked to prison or to an alternative.
Delaware (SB 50) reduced probationary sentences to between one and two years for
nonviolent offenders.
Nebraska (LB 46) provided probation officers the authority to impose administrative
sanctions in lieu of revocations for technical probation violations.
Nevada (SB 232) provided the parole board with discretion to impose shorter terms of
re-incarceration for, and to restore earned release credits to, technical violators whose
mandatory-release parole is revoked. 
Washington (SB 5990) ended active supervision for many low-level felony post-
releasees.
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that, public perceptions aside, crime
may increase if prison sentences are
decreased; and that the promised cost
savings from reducing sentences are
either illusory or will only be realized
too far in the future. In Maryland, for
example, a bill to eliminate manda-
tory minimum sentences for repeat
drug offenders did not emerge from
the House judiciary committee.
According to one of its co-sponsors,
Delegate Anthony Brown, “Maryland
has difficulty making reforms when it
comes to how severely we sentence
our offenders. We punish people.”20
With respect to the drug offender
sentencing bill in particular, Brown
points to “a sentiment among some
members that drug offenders are
violent criminals, that to call them
nonviolent is inaccurate,” as well as
the persistent reluctance to vote for
measures that might earn them the
soft-on-crime label.
Expanding Treatment-Based
Alternatives to Incarceration. 
In some states, however, there is an
emerging consensus that sentences
for drug offenses, particularly low-
level possession offenses, should 
be revisited, and that treatment
alternatives may not only be more
cost effective but also more appropri-
ate than prison. Senator Kermit
Brashear of Nebraska is part of this
consensus. “Oftentimes you put a
nonviolent substance abuser in
prison and a violent substance
abuser will come out,” he explains.
“[N]onviolent offenders and sub-
stance abusers…should be provided
rehabilitation instead of simply
throwing them away in prison.”21
This is not to deny that many
forms of substance abuse treatment
programming have been cut along
with corrections and other agency
budgets. In 2003 Pennsylvania cut
roughly 20 percent of its commu-
nity-based treatment dollars for both
offenders and the general public.
Alaska made significant reductions
to facility-based treatment programs.
In general, programs that promise
near-term savings—such as those
that offer diversion from prison—
are garnering support, while those
that do not—such as facility-based
treatment—are suffering cuts. 
Even more telling, however, are
recent initiatives that buck this trend
by investing in treatment without
the promise of a near-term fiscal
payback. In Maryland, despite the
legislature’s decision not to enact
drug sentencing reform, Mary Ann
Saar, the secretary of public safety
and correctional services, has
proposed a significant re-direction 
of correctional resources toward
rehabilitation for substance-abusing
offenders. Among other things, the
proposal would replace corrections
officer positions with teachers and
counselors. Saar is also calling for 
a more than four-fold increase in
prison treatment beds and a large
boost in educational programming.
The goal of these proposals, accord-
ing to Governor Robert Ehrlich, is to
stop “the revolving door that keeps
inmates coming back into the
system, when they should return
home with the treatment services
necessary to become productive
members of society.”22
It is too early to tell whether the
proposal will translate into concrete
and amply funded facility-based
treatment programs, but the past
year’s legislative activity across the
nation reveals that Maryland is part
of a larger sentencing trend. Five
states enacted often complex and
long-planned sentencing reforms
that replace jail and prison sentences
with substance abuse treatment
programming. These reforms
include Kansas’s mandatory diver-
sion bill (see page 11) and Indiana’s
discretionary Forensic Diversion
Program, which authorizes judges 
to divert all offenders for whom
substance abuse or mental illness
was a contributing factor in the
offense.23 Other states have carved
out new funding to support drug
courts, too. California, for example,
transferred an additional $2.1 million
from the corrections budget to
support drug courts that divert
otherwise prison-bound offenders.
With a similar diversion proviso,
Michigan appropriated an additional
$1.3 million annually to support its
drug courts.
States that repealed mandatory minimums and 
otherwise reduced sentences
Colorado (SB 318) reduced penalties for possession of one gram or less of any
controlled substance and allowed judges to sentence to community supervision rather
than to prison. 
Delaware (HB 210) decreased mandatory minimum sentences for trafficking in illegal
drugs. The bill also increased sentences for six violent offenses.
Maine (LD 856) lowered the available mandatory minimum sentence for anyone
convicted of trafficking drugs to a minor. Previously, only those with no prior criminal
histories might be sentenced to these lower minimums.
Michigan (Public Acts 665, 666, and 670) eliminated most of Michigan’s mandatory
minimum sentences for drug offenses and provided for shorter probation terms. 
Washington (SB 5990) accelerated the implementation of the Drug Sentence Reform
Act of 2002, which instituted a new drug offense grid that significantly reduces
sentences for all drug offenses.
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Changing Attitudes: 
Four Case Studies
Conversations with policymakers 
in the second half of 2003 indicate
that public and political attitudes
toward some aspects of criminal
sentencing are changing. In fact, the
shift began before the onset of the
budget crises, resulting in part from
steadily decreasing violent crime
rates and a growing concern in some
quarters about the numbers and
racial and ethnic make-up of people
sent to prison.24 Of course, such
changes do not lead inevitably to
changes in policy. Indeed, perhaps a
dozen legislative initiatives to shift
correctional priorities were offered
but not enacted in the past 18
months. These include attempts to
mandate diversion for drug posses-
sion offenses in Louisiana,
Massachusetts, and Montana, and
efforts to authorize departures from
mandatory minimum sentences in
Maine. Still, efforts at change are
widespread, gaining sturdier political
legs, and continuing to grow both in
number and kind. 
To better understand the vitality of
these developments, one must look
beyond the product to the process
and how policymakers describe their
goals and the nature of the debate.
The following case studies examine
how policymakers in four states
describe the changing attitudes that
led to reform. In each case one can
begin to discern a sea change from
the policies of the past 20 years, even
if it remains to be seen how deep
and sustainable these shifts are. 
Alabama
Using Data to Craft Reforms. With 
a rate of incarceration 43 percent
greater than the national average,
Alabama puts more people in prison
relative to its population than all but
four other states.25 However, it is
also one of the poorest states in the
nation and hard pressed to pay for
such toughness—a problem recently
underscored when voters rejected a
tax hike championed by the new
Republican administration that
would have financed increases in
corrections spending. As a result,
Alabama spends less per inmate
than any other state—about $10,000
per year. It is also subject to two
court orders to relieve its over-
crowded prisons and faces additional
pending litigation alleging inade-
quate health care for inmates. With
28,000 inmates housed in prisons
built for 12,000 and no new tax
support on the horizon, the state is
now creating a special parole docket
to accelerate the release of 5,000
nonviolent inmates. The need for
sentencing change is clear.
Fortunately, the state’s efforts to
apply a rational approach to sentenc-
ing have begun to bear fruit thanks
States that mandated drug treatment and fostered 
other alternatives to incarceration
Alabama (SB 337) authorized a county commission to establish a locally run
community punishment program and authorized judges to sentence offenders to such
programs in lieu of incarceration. The bill also established the Community Corrections
Division in the Department of Corrections to assist counties in establishing and
maintaining community-based punishment programs. 
Arkansas (HB 2353) established a statewide system of drug courts and increased
funding by almost $3 million for fiscal year 2004 to expand the number of drug courts
in the state from seven to 27.
California increased funding for its drug courts by approximately $2.1 million in fiscal
year 2004; the funds are to be transferred from the corrections budget and are to
target otherwise prison-bound offenders.
Colorado (SB 318) authorized judges to sentence those convicted of possessing one
gram or less of any controlled substance to community supervision rather than to
prison and provided for at least $2.2 million per biennium for treatment services.
Idaho (HB 369) provided for a two percent surcharge on liquor sales and earmarked
the funds for drug courts.
Indiana (HB 1001) gave judges discretion to suspend the entire sentences of offenders
convicted of any crime when drug or alcohol use or mental illness is a contributing
factor. Offenders are put on probation and diverted to a community treatment program.
Kansas (SB 123) mandated drug treatment for possession offenders who have no
felony convictions for person crimes or for drug trafficking. The Sentencing Commis-
sion estimates that the total population for treatment will be 1,439 offenders per year.
Technical violations alone will not result in discharge from the program or revocation to
prison; rather, such offenders may be subject to an array of non-prison sanctions. 
Louisiana (SB 108) authorized judicial districts to establish job intervention programs
for certain nonviolent first-time offenders in lieu of incarceration. 
Michigan (SB 281) increased state funding by $1.3 million and federal Byrne funding
by $1.8 million to support drug court programs that target prison-bound offenders.
Missouri (SB 5) allowed courts to sentence nonviolent offenders to 12 to 24 months of
a drug abuse treatment program in lieu of incarceration.
Texas (HB 2668) required a probationary sentence for first time drug possessors
convicted of possessing amounts of controlled substances that are punishable as state 
jail felonies. For drug possessors with prior felony convictions, judges have discretion to
impose a probationary sentence with treatment. The bill is estimated to lower the state
jail population by 2,500 people and save the state $30 million over the next five years.
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to careful data collection and
analysis provided by the Alabama
Sentencing Commission. From its
inception in 2000, the commission
focused on establishing a compre-
hensive database of offender and
incident demographics as well as
models it can apply to provide
analyses and projections. Its
commitment to data collection and
analysis prompted the legislature 
to hold off on changes that affect
sentences until the commission
could make its recommendations.
“They didn’t drop criminal law bills
in the hopper like they used to; they
wanted to know what a bill’s impact
would be on the prison population
based on our felony offender data,”
explains Lynda Flynt, the commis-
sion’s executive director.26 The
commission also had the support 
of Alabama’s then-attorney general,
Bill Pryor, a proponent of data-driven
reform.
In 2003 the commission pro-
posed a trio of sentencing changes.
The proposals, which included a
long-term sentencing reform act
requiring the development of a data-
driven structured sentencing system,
were grounded in analyses of data
from 64,000 felony cases from the
past four years, as well as informa-
tion from corrections, parole, and
other sources.
The commission’s shorter-term
recommendations included a
proposed realigning and raising of
felony theft thresholds. For years it
had been evident that the classifica-
tion of theft and related offenses 
was inconsistent—receiving stolen
property of a certain value was a
felony, for example, while stealing
the same property was a misde-
meanor. Although few thought the
problem important enough to focus
on, the commission’s data crunching
showed that first- and second-degree
theft and related offenses accounted
for 11 percent of Alabama’s prison
population.27 Its subsequent analysis
of national data showed that the
threshold for felony theft was lower
in Alabama than it was in 82 percent
of the states, and the levels in
Alabama were either the same as—
or lower than—they were in 1978. 
More importantly, the commis-
sion’s simulation model provided
policymakers with detailed projec-
tions of the effects of the proposed
statutory changes. Raising the mis-
demeanor/felony thresholds from
$100 and $250 to $500 across the
board, with similar increases to the
thresholds between felonies of
different degrees, would result in
3,000 fewer offenders imprisoned
over five years—a nine-percent drop.
The decrease in the female prison
population would be an even greater
12 percent. Together, the changes
would yield a six-percent drop in the
proportion of imprisoned offenders
classified as low-security risk,
effectively reserving more prison
space for high risk, generally violent,
offenders.
“We were able to provide an
analysis that showed the definite
projected impact of very specific
changes to the law. That’s the first
time that’s been done in Alabama,”
recalls Rosa Davis, chief assistant
attorney general and a member of
the commission’s executive commit-
tee. “For those who were willing to
listen, that impressed them.”28
Apparently enough were willing,
States that established study commissions 
and sentencing commissions
Arizona (SB 1387) established a sentencing commission with the broad mandate to
investigate and report on a variety of sentencing practices. 
Indiana (HB 1145) established a two-year study committee to evaluate sentencing
laws and policies. 
Maine (LD 1614) created the Commission to Improve the Sentencing, Supervision,
Management, and Incarceration of Prisoners. Its mandate is to make recommendations
to reduce prison and jail populations (including by identifying appropriate alternatives to
incarceration); to reduce corrections costs and recidivism; and to improve public safety.
Nebraska (LB 46) created, as part of a broader sentencing initiative, a Community
Corrections Council to develop and implement statewide enhanced community
corrections options and begin development of voluntary sentencing guidelines. 
Nevada (SCR 38) directed the Legislative Commission to conduct an interim study of
halfway houses and other transitional housing for offenders. 
New Hampshire (HB 825) established a committee to study methods of safely
reducing the prison population. 
New Mexico (HB 510) created the New Mexico Sentencing Commission, which it
assigned all the tasks and duties formerly undertaken by the Criminal and Juvenile
Justice Coordinating Council.
North Dakota (HCR 3008) directed the Legislative Council to study various aspects of
the state’s criminal justice system.
South Carolina (SB 626) established a joint corrections and penology study committee
to study prison population management.
Wisconsin (2002 AB 1; 2003 SB 44) established its Sentencing Commission
pursuant to legislation enacted in 2002. 
Wyoming (SB 16) directed the Department of Administration and Information to
conduct an evaluation and programmatic critique of the state’s corrections system.
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because the commission’s recom-
mendations were enacted. 
For Davis, the legislative success
demonstrated that data can be used
effectively. In this case, she says, data
served an important policy goal. “I
think there is a growing change in
attitude about who goes to prison.
Prison may not be the best form of
punishment for some categories of
offenders, specifically low-level
property offenders.” Commission
director Lynda Flynt focuses on the
difference the capacity for data
analysis has made. “Now, every time
a sentencing bill comes up in the
legislature, they turn to us and ask
what effect it is going to have on
prison populations. This is ground-
breaking for Alabama,” she says.
Although much work remains for 
the commission, and the funding
challenge continues to be daunting,
Davis and Flynt agree that Alabama is
closer than ever to achieving a more
rational and fair sentencing system.
Delaware
Proportioning Drug and Violent
Crime Sentences. A growing prison
population in Delaware presented
policymakers there with a stark
choice: either build 1,000 more
prison beds or alter sentencing
practices. Officials chose the latter
option on the theory that an
adequate supply of prison beds
should be reserved for violent
offenders. To make this work in
tough fiscal times, they resolved 
that certain nonviolent offenders
must serve less time behind bars.
They achieved the needed reductions
by applying the principle of propor-
tionality, specifically by evaluating
sentences for drug and violent
offenses in relation to each other. 
Because Delaware does not
imprison those who possess small
quantities of drugs—the population
seen as most amenable to non-prison
sanctions—or even sellers of small
quantities, it had to find its savings
among more serious offenders.
House Bill 210 reduced the manda-
tory minimum sentences for drug
traffickers—those who sell or
possess quantities indicative of fairly
significant selling—and doubled the
quantity threshold—to 10 grams—
for cocaine and some other drugs to
more accurately reflect the crime of
trafficking. It also made traffickers
eligible to spend the final 180 days of
their prison sentences in community
corrections facilities or programs,
where treatment would be available.
For second-offense selling or
possessing with intent to sell smaller
quantities of most narcotic drugs, the
bill eliminated a 15-year minimum
prison term and otherwise reduced
by half the mandatory minimum
sentence. The bill balanced these
reductions by increasing the severity
level or raising the mandatory
minimum sentence for six violent
offenses and reclassifying another
offense as violent.
Very few states have tried to
reform sentencing for people who
sell drugs or possess quantities that
suggest an intent to sell, let alone
people who traffic in more signifi-
cant quantities.29 After all, support
for rehabilitative responses to drug
addiction may have grown, but
sympathy for, or understanding of,
“drug dealers” has not. Nonetheless,
in Delaware advocacy groups and
some members of the legislature
were able to make the case that most
people who sell or possess these
quantities of drugs do so only
because they, too, are addicts. 
About the time that policymakers
were rethinking these sentences, 
the public was calling for stronger
measures against violent felonies,
particularly domestic burglaries and
firearms offenses. In response to
these concerns, Attorney General
Jane Brady proposed increasing
sentences for firearms and some
other violent offenses. Her proposal
also would have given judges
discretion to depart from mandatory
minimum sentences for traffickers
of 10 grams or less of drugs if they
had no prior violent felony convic-
tions. But key members of the
legislature resisted the change,
fearing it would accelerate prison
population growth and require the
construction of additional beds. 
The attorney general and her
legislative supporters faced another
significant obstacle. A sentencing
reform advocacy group with a strong
public and legislative following,
Stand Up for what is Right and Just
(SURJ), had two proposals of its own
on the table. One that had garnered
the sponsorship of 34 of the state’s
62 legislators would have granted
judges discretion to depart from any
mandatory minimum drug sentence.
Still, opposition from the attorney
general and key legislators might
“We were able to provide an analysis that showed the definite projected
impact of very specific changes to the law. That’s the first time that’s been
done in Alabama.”
—Rosa Davis, Alabama Chief Assistant Attorney General
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have blocked the proposal’s passage.
SURJ and other drug reform
proponents needed to win over the
attorney general, and the attorney
general needed to appease legisla-
tors’ fiscal and drug policy concerns.
The table was set for compromise. 
Delaware’s Sentencing
Accountability Commission (SEN-
TAC), which had played an active
role in focusing the debate, brokered
the compromise. “The two philo-
sophical bents ran into each other.
The way it came out is a testament
to a new time,” says Judge Richard
Gebelein, who was then chairman 
of SENTAC.30 Steven Wood, chief
prosecutor in the attorney general’s
office, agrees. “What appeared to be
an unholy alliance of conservatives
and liberals became a cooperative
effort to reserve scarce prison beds
for violent offenders,” he says.31
“SURJ was proceeding from the
premise that drug sentences were
entirely too harsh; we agreed, to the
extent that we saw them as too harsh
when compared to sentences for
violent offenders.” The two sides
came together, then, by focusing on
how sentences for drug offenders
stack up against those for violent
offenders, rather than on whether
each sentence is appropriate in the
abstract. 
Among the substantive changes
wrought by the bill, the most
important to Judge Gebelein is the
authority granted to the corrections
department to move trafficking
offenders from prison to commu-
nity-based treatment programs
during the final 180 days of their
sentences. Now, a person convicted
of selling or possessing between 10
and 50 grams of cocaine might serve
no more than one and one-half years
in prison before being provided with
six months of treatment in a halfway
house or residential treatment
facility. Under the previous law, sale
or possession of as little as five
grams would have required twice the
minimum prison sentence with no
provision for community-based
treatment after incarceration.
For Judge Gebelein, the legisla-
tion is symbolically significant for
what it portends. “For 15 years this
three-year mandatory minimum [for
first felony trafficking] was a line
drawn in cement. What was once
cast in stone is now negotiable,” he
says. Gebelein believes the compro-
mise also reveals something
important about current attitudes:
“There is a greater realization that
the people who commit these
offenses are addicts, and that addicts
might be our friends, neighbors, or
associates. Many folks who commu-
nicate with their legislators were
saying, in effect, ‘my son has a drug
problem and he doesn’t need to be in
prison.’ Treatment began to be seen
as a preferred option.” 
The fiscal crisis provided only a
mid-course assist to Delaware’s
reform process; change was in the
offing well before the crisis took
hold. “We and many others have
been waging this war for years,”
explains Victor Battaglia, Sr., an
attorney who serves on SURJ’s board
of directors.32 Money played a role 
in getting the bill passed, Battaglia
concedes, but it was not a major
factor. “We insisted the debate
should not be on how cheaply we
can get by but on how we can
improve public safety through better
drug policies,” he says. 
Deputy Attorney General Wood
has a similar impression: “The
financial pressures cause you to 
look more closely at how you spend
your money, but this [bill] was also
the product of a more moderate
approach. It was assumed that we
weren’t going to increase capacity at
this time, so we focused on a more
rational allocation of prison beds.” 
Indeed, the legislation reflects a
reversal in public and legislative
perception from the late-1980s, when
drug sentences stood unchanged
while all others were reduced by two-
thirds to account for Delaware’s
truth-in-sentencing legislation.
Achieved through consensus
grounded in proportionality, it gave
broader relief from strict drug
sentences than SURJ’s proposal
would have, and it increased mini-
mum sentences for a greater number
of violent offenses than the attorney
general’s proposal would have, at
least as measured in bed savings. 
Kansas
Focusing on Rehabilitation Through
Diversion to Treatment. Historically,
Kansas has been tough on crime. 
It requires offenders to serve 85
percent of prison sentences without
discretionary parole release and
traditionally has sent certain drug
offenders, even many who possess
small quantities, to prison. Yet
Kansas began looking for ways to
curb its prison population before 
the onset of its budget crisis. By
“It was assumed that we weren’t going to increase capacity at this time, so
we focused on a more rational allocation of prison beds.”
—Steven Wood, Delaware Deputy Attorney General
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statutory mandate, the Kansas
Sentencing Commission must
explore alternatives to incarceration
whenever population projections
show that capacity will be exceeded
within three years—and in the
summer of 2000, the state’s prison
population was at 98 percent of
capacity and growing. 
According to Barbara Tombs, the
commission’s executive director at
the time, the commission began
focusing on offenders it deemed
least likely to cause a public safety
concern if diverted from prison:
those who possess relatively small
quantities of drugs. The trend had
been toward incarceration; from
1997 to 1999, the number of
offenders sentenced to prison for
first-offense, low-level possession
had increased by 65 percent, from
324 to 534, while the number
sentenced to probation had
remained steady at just below 900.
Moreover, most people recently sent
to prison for first- and second-
offense possession originally were
sentenced to probation but were
remanded for violating their
conditions, a trend that underscored
the need for adequate and effective
treatment services. Despite the
passage in 2000 of Senate Bill 323,
instituting mandatory graduated
sanctions for probation violators and
modified probation and post-release
supervision for certain nonviolent
offenders, the state was facing a
projected prison population 
increase of almost seven percent 
by 2003.
In a heated political landscape—
SB 323 had become a central issue in
the Republican primary for attorney
general after a man who was
reported (erroneously) to have been
released under the bill was charged
with murder—the commission
began what Tombs describes 
as a careful process of examination
and analysis, first within the
commission and subsequently with
the legislature. “The [commission]
members came to realize that the
current situation was simply
recycling offenders and not address-
ing the root causes of their criminal
conduct—addiction,” Tombs
recalls.33 At the same time, they
recognized that many in the
legislature doubted the efficacy of
treatment. So they began to learn as
much as possible about what other
states had done to replace prison
with effective treatment alternatives.
“We brought in people from
California and from Washington and
from NCSL [the National Conference
of State Legislatures] to report on
what works,” says Tombs. It was
during this process that the budget
crisis hit. 
In late 2001 the commission
decided to propose legislation that
would both divert nonviolent drug
possessors from prison and institute
a comprehensive regimen of
effective treatment options—with
eligibility narrowly defined to
maximize political support and
minimize the risk to public safety. 
It was now time to take the class-
room to the legislature. Before long,
says Tombs, there was an incipient
consensus that prison had not been
an effective answer to drug posses-
sion, and more and more legislators
began asking, “Why build another
prison when it’s not working?” 
As debate in committees proceeded,
lawmakers overcame their resist-
ance to rehabilitative approaches
and began exploring broader goals
than bed savings. According to
Tombs, many were won over by
emerging testimony about
California’s Proposition 36—a fully
funded diversion-to-treatment
approach. Treatment providers also
argued persuasively that a long-term
continuum of services could
promise far greater recidivism
prevention than could prison with
only limited treatment—even for 
the growing number of people 
who abuse methamphetamine.
Tombs credits as well a frank
discussion of “the many unspoken
costs involved with addiction and
incarceration,” such as unpaid child
support, additional medical costs,
and tax revenues lost from people
not working.
After two months of debate in
the spring of 2003, the legislature
enacted Senate Bill 123, mandating
drug treatment and supervision
rather than incarceration for low-
level first- and second-offense drug
possession. An estimated 1,439
people will be directed to commu-
nity-based treatment each year as a
result, roughly 475 of whom would
have gone to prison absent the 
new legislation. To ensure that
participants receive appropriate
treatment, the bill called for a two-
pronged assessment of safety risk
and substance abuse needs and
stipulated that treatment providers
be trained and certified by the
Department of Corrections. The
legislature underscored its determi-
nation to provide rehabilitation—
and not just free up prison
beds—by appropriating $5.7 million
to fully underwrite the 18-month
“It became about what was right, not just about how to save money.” 
—John Vratil, Kansas State Senator
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treatment regimen called for in the
bill. And the funding—approxi-
mately $4,700 for each partici-
pant—travels with the offender
from provider to provider, through
detoxification, rehabilitation,
relapse prevention, etc.
The state’s budget crisis may
have been a key catalyst for this
legislation, particularly for fiscal
conservatives determined to curb
prison costs and avoid new prison
construction. But some participants
in the process offer additional
explanations for how tough-on-
crime Kansas came to enact a fully
funded mandatory treatment
diversion bill in the midst of a
serious budget crisis and over the
opposition of the attorney general
and the state’s sheriffs, peace
officers, and court services officers.
According to Tombs, it was the
deliberative process, backed by data
and tempered by compromise, that
led many to see that rehabilitative
approaches to substance-abusing
offenders can work and that it was
time to reconsider the state’s
longstanding reliance on prison. 
A fundamental change in attitude
developed in the process of studying
the problem and crafting the
reform. “The process was about the
legislators rethinking and being
accountable for what legislatively
had been done in the past,” she
says. In the 2003 session, the
legislature did not pass any bills that
would have increased the use of
incarceration, including one
championed by both the governor
and the attorney general. Senator
John Vratil, chairman of the
judiciary committee, says the
process convinced many of his
colleagues that a rehabilitative
alternative to incarceration was not
only fiscally wise but also, more
importantly, that it was the appropri-
ate criminal justice response for this
group of substance-abusing
offenders: “It became about what
was right, not just about how to 
save money.”34
Arizona
Focusing on Rehabilitation Through
Transition Services. Debates about
correctional responses to drug
addiction are not new to Arizona. In
1996 its voters passed Proposition
200, the nation’s first successful
effort to replace incarceration with
treatment for some substance
abusing offenders. Opponents of 
the measure have been battling to
curtail it and subsequent reform
efforts ever since—even as Arizona
incarcerates offenders at a greater
rate than any of the other 12
western states.35 With its own
prisons filled to capacity, Arizona
now sends six percent of its inmates
to private facilities—both in and out
of the state. Yet the debate about the
prison population rages on, to the
point of becoming the focus of a
special legislative session in the 
fall of 2003. Emerging from this
turbulent backdrop, however, are
signs of a new attitude toward
helping offenders prepare for their
return to the community.36
Arizona’s Senate Bill 1291
created a transition program
offering drug offenders treatment
prior to release from prison and a
range of services—job training and
employment, housing and health
insurance assistance, mentoring,
States that expanded transition programs
Arizona (SB 1291) created a transition program for drug offenders that provides
rehabilitative and training services prior to and after release and allows participants to
be released three months earlier than their prior earliest release date. The program will
be funded by reinvesting the savings derived from the early releases, as well as by
deductions of eight percent from wages earned by drug offenders while incarcerated. 
Delaware (HB 210) authorized the release of drug offenders to community-based,
treatment-centered programming for the last 180 days of incarceration, and the
housing of DUI offenders in such programs for all of their sentences. 
Idaho (HB 464) committed $736,000 in new general funds to expand transition
services.
Missouri (SB 5) allowed nonviolent offenders with two years or less remaining on their
sentences to apply for home detention. 
Nevada (SB 264) authorized the Department of Corrections to establish locally based
reentry programs. Among those eligible are certain prisoners within two years of
release, parolees as a condition of parole, and technical parole violators in lieu of
revocation of parole.
Oklahoma (HB 1061) required that all nonviolent offenders be moved to work release
programs, work centers, community corrections centers, intermediate sanctions
facilities, accredited halfway houses, or transitional living centers 210 days prior to
release from prison; offenders convicted of violent offenses may be moved to such
programs 180 days prior to release. 
Virginia (HB 2245) authorized giving nonviolent inmates the opportunity to participate
in a residential community program, work release, or other community-based programs
within six months of their release date.
Washington (SB 5990) committed $3 million over two years to pre-release treatment
programming.
Wyoming (SB 17) allowed offenders who are within 24 months of parole eligibility to
be transferred to a community corrections program.
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and continuing treatment—after
they return to the community.
Senator Mark Anderson, author of
the initiative, says he framed the
legislation from the taxpayers’ point
of view. “We are making a bad
investment if we release people
from prison no better off than when
they went in,” he says. “Giving
people $50 and dropping them off
at a homeless shelter after years in
prison has meant that we release
people whose chances of succeed-
ing are pretty slim.”37
The bill established a pilot
program that will serve an 
estimated 200 offenders per year.
Approximately $4,500 will be made
available for services provided to
each participant. The legislation
focused on people leaving prison
with addiction problems because, 
as Anderson puts it, “you can’t be a
good employee if you’re an addict;
you can’t be a good parent if you’re
an addict. It’s fundamental to the
success of thousands of inmates
who are released every year.”
But how does Anderson explain
the new willingness among
legislators to support initiatives that
improve offenders’ chances? “It’s a
combination of things,” he says.
“The big factor is that people’s eyes
have been opened because so many
more are coming out of prison now
than any time in the past—because
we began locking up so many more
people 10 years ago.” It may also be
fiscal: “Legislators who would
normally have said ‘No, I’m tough
on crime,’ when we asked for their
support are now seeing the bill
come due from our past policies. 
So they are ready to support this.”
Anderson believes legislators are
taking courage from a change in the
public’s view as well. “They [the
public] are more sympathetic to the
whole issue; they want to see people
coming out with a different attitude,
with a job, going back to their
families. And they too, as taxpayers,
see the cost of locking people up.” 
The bill’s most innovative aspect
is a funding mechanism that created
a self-sustaining link between
providing enhanced rehabilitative
services and a reduced emphasis 
on incarceration. The bill directed
that participants in the program be
released three months earlier than
their previous earliest release date,
after completing in-facility program-
ming and treatment. The money
saved is to be earmarked for pre-
and post-release transition program-
ming. The cost reductions are to be
identified by the department, but 
no less than $500,000 must be
committed to transition services in
fiscal year 2004. By linking the
anticipated savings from a reduced
emphasis on incarceration to the
funding of alternative programming
that supports or supplants the
reduced incarceration, policymakers
are trying to elevate the program-
ming from the realm of “non-
essential” correctional services and
make it a priority among core
corrections goals.
During earlier decades of rapid
prison population growth, transi-
tion programming received little
emphasis and few resources. The
success of SB 1291 shows a changed
attitude toward the possibilities of
rehabilitative, educational, and
vocational approaches, and the
appropriateness of these approaches
in the corrections scheme. For
Senator Anderson, who included a
reporting requirement in the
legislation, the bill is important not
only for its modest immediate goal
but also for what it may lead to. “If
this [initiative] helps with recidi-
vism we can expand it. We are
trying to build comfort with this
and similar ideas; we are trying to
build a model.”
Conclusion
In reviewing how states have
responded to their budget crises,
this Issue in Brief focuses on
distinctions between the fiscal and
the philosophical, between changing
fortunes and changing attitudes.
The dichotomy is not absolute, of
course. Even as many are rethinking
criminal justice responses, particu-
larly for nonviolent, substance-
abusing offenders, there are others
preserving resources until they can
again afford the largely punitive
responses of previous decades.
There are also those whose views
fall in between or are in flux. On
balance, what do these recent state
responses portend? Are advocates 
of indiscriminate tough-on-crime
policies simply waiting out the lean
times? Or have the budget crises
helped to cultivate a sustainable
appetite for new approaches to
sentencing and incarceration? 
The actions reported in this
paper, particularly the case studies
discussed in the second half,
indicate that while the budget crises
are providing the occasion for
change, the reforms are often
anchored in changing attitudes and
philosophy. These are evident in a
greater use of data to structure
sentencing, a reliance on propor-
tionality in determining appropriate
sentences, and a renewed focus on
rehabilitiation. The mass of activity
in the 2003 legislative sessions
suggests that many policymakers
have become emboldened to change
the way states approach sentencing
and corrections. If this is indeed the
case, we may well see the emerging
correctional reforms outlast the
budget crises.
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